Enmeshment vs. Transcendence (and some Blade Runner)

Or as may be more familiarly formulated by anthropologists, structure vs. agency, the age old question. Still, for an individual as the unit of analysis, I like the concept of enmeshment, since it seems to contain within it the circumstances of struggle. Structure seems too passive, too immobilizing, though it may be helpful at larger scales.

Using the word individual is misleading, not only because I am not sure such a thing exists, but also because questioning one's autonomy in terms of decision-making is the subject of today's musings. If I am a social construct, albeit a unique one, is it possible for me to transcend my programming, instilled within me over decades by the collective actions of myriad agents of culture? If it is possible, is it even wise to subvert one's own programming?

It seems to me that one must really solve, once and for all, this conundrum of how much personhood and autonomy one really has in order for much rational decision-making to take place. I am forcibly reminded of the troubles facing both replicants and alleged humans in Blade Runner, who has a claim to true personhood, and what does that claim rest upon? Is it the question of a natural and biological and accidental genesis as opposed to an origin that is artificial, inorganic, and intentional? If so, there are quite a few among us now who would fail to qualify as human on those bases.

If we are collectively programmed constructs in flesh, then can we have a personal morality? Or must it always remain a social morality. If social, then is any decision I might make foreseeable, inevitable? Can I even make 'wrong' decisions? Or, and this is an odd thought, can I only make 'wrong' decisions if my programming is somehow flawed, through the embodied nature of consciousness. Would that then mean that, flaws make me an individual, and thus, ultimately responsible for my decisions after all?